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FOURTH AMENDMENT-GuILT BY RELATION: IF YOUR 
BROTHER Is CONVICTED OF A CRIME, You Too MAY Do TIME 
"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment 
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. "1 
INTRODUCTION 
Given advancing technology and growing safety concerns in re­
cent years, U.S. citizens have suffered a loss of privacy at the hands 
of the government.2 For the most part, citizens have silently en­
dured with the understanding that zealous governmental actions are 
well intentioned and designed to protect Americans.3 But a new 
privacy concern has now emerged that should cause Americans 
great alarm. This new governmental surveillance tactic is designed 
to generate criminal suspects based solely upon genetics. It targets 
people for criminal investigation based upon their relationship to a 
person who has, at some point in time, been convicted of a crime. 
It is called a familial search. 
On one hand, society wants criminals to be identified and pun­
ished for their crimes. On the other hand, innocent family mem­
bers should not forfeit their privacy rights simply because they are 
related to someone who has been convicted of a crime.4 Consider 
the following hypothetical. 
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2. School children have been forced to have their fingerprints scanned before eat­
ing lunch in their cafeteria, cameras have been installed at public shrines, people are 
subjected to full-body x-rays and baggage searches at airports, and facial recognition 
cameras are used at public sporting events. Bob Barr, Op-Ed., What Is Happening to 
Our Privacy?, DAILY COURIER (Connellsville, Pa.), July 8, 2003, available at 2003 
WLNR 13948726 (Westlaw). 
3. While a majority of people polled stated that President Bush should obtain a 
warrant before monitoring private phone conversations and Internet communications, 
other data indicate that when balancing privacy concerns against fighting the threat of 
terrorism, people view safety as the higher priority. Tom Raum, How Far Will the Gov­
ernment Go on Spying?, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES (Pa.), Jan. 22, 2006, at 1B, 
available at 2006 WLNR 1390337 (Westlaw). 
4. CBS News.com, A Not So Perfect Match: How Near-DNA Matches Can In­
criminate Relatives of Criminals, July 15, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/ 
23/60minutes/main2600721.shtml (last visited Dec. 24, 2007) [hereinafter A Not So Per­
fect Match] (Stephen Mercer, a Maryland attorney, admonishing the use of familial 
searChes). 
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A. Your Brother's Sin-A Hypothetical 
Brian Taylor and his brothers were brought up by their father 
in a poor neighborhood in Hartford, Connecticut. Brian's brothers 
have engaged in criminal lifestyles from the time they were teenag­
ers. Nicholas, Brian's brother, is incarcerated in Connecticut for 
armed robbery. Resisting a life of crime, Brian committed himself 
to his studies and earned a doctorate in psychology. He is now an 
esteemed professor at Harvard University. Although Brian loves 
his brothers, he cut off all ties with them many years ago. In an 
attempt to maintain an untarnished reputation and avoid the 
trouble that surrounds his family, Brian has kept his family history a 
secret from his peers at Harvard. 
One dark, icy, December night Brian was on campus walking 
to his car when his student, Jessica, approached him. They spoke 
for a few minutes. Because it was dark and not too many students 
were on campus, Brian offered to walk Jessica to her car. Jessica 
accepted. As they walked, Jessica slipped on the ice, grabbed 
Brian's hand to stop her fall, and accidentally scratched him. Brian 
did not mention it, and Jessica did not realize that she scratched 
him. At Jessica's car, Brian told her to drive safely, said goodbye, 
and walked away. 
As Jessica sat in her car waiting for her windshield to defrost, 
she realized that she left her purse in the school. Although she 
dreaded the thought of braving the parking lot again, she needed 
her purse. As soon as Jessica stepped out of her car she was forced 
back in and brutally raped. She never saw her attacker's face. Jes­
sica fought very hard, as she screamed and kicked her attacker. 
The attacker wore a condom, facemask, hat, jacket, and gloves. 
He left no DNA behind. Forensic DNA was recovered, however. 
It was Brian's DNA found under Jessica's nails, which the police 
wrongly assumed belonged to her attacker. The DNA was submit­
ted to Massachusetts law enforcement to run through the DNA­
indexing database. The goal was to match the forensic DNA to 
DNA stored in the database belonging to someone with a criminal 
record. 
In the meantime, the police interviewed Brian since he was the 
last person to see Jessica before the rape. The police initially ruled 
him out. Later, they received information from Connecticut law 
enforcement about a near-match hit to the forensic DNA found 
under Jessica's nails. It belonged to Brian's brother, Nicholas. The 
police knew the forensic DNA did not belong to Nicholas because 
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he was incarcerated when the rape occurred. However, they 
surmised that the attacker must have been Brian since he was the 
last person to see Jessica before the rape and based on the similari­
ties between the forensic DNA and the DNA found in the DNA­
indexing database. Consequently, the police obtained a warrant for 
Brian's DNA to compare to the forensic DNA. Not surprisingly, 
Brian's DNA matched the forensic DNA. Arrested and charged 
with rape, Brian is now awaiting trial. Brian is innocent. 
His attorney is attempting to have the DNA evidence sup­
pressed at trial. His argument is that the DNA evidence is poison­
ous fruit because the police obtained it based on information 
gleaned from an unconstitutional familial search of the DNA-index­
ing database. 
B. The Problem 
The FBI now permits the use of familial searches to investigate 
crimes.s As illustrated by the hypothetical, the use of familial 
searches may lead to devastating results because innocent family 
members, who would not have been suspected but for a genetic 
link, may be transformed into criminal suspects. The legal issue is 
whether familial searches amount to unreasonable searches by the 
government in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The FBI's pol­
icy concerning familial searches is so new that no court has reported 
a decision on this issue yet. This Note anticipates the potential ar­
guments that defendants who have been targeted by law enforce­
ment based on familial searches might make and ultimately 
concludes that familial searches are unconstitutional. 
Part I provides a background on DNA. An introduction to the 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the database that stores 
DNA, is set out in Part I.A. Parts I.B and I.C respectively discuss 
DNA as a powerful crime-solving tool and the pros and cons of 
CODIS. Part I.D presents new developments in the use of DNA 
profiling. 
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
governmental searches and seizures is described in detail in Part II. 
Parts II.A and II.B set out the purpose and scope of the Fourth 
Amendment, including the standing and reasonableness tests. Part 
III discusses the treatment of a search and seizure absent individu­
alized suspicion of wrongdoing, which includes an introduction to 
5. Mark Hansen, Match Point: How a Denver Rape Probe Got the FBI to Change 
Policy and Release Kinship DNA, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2006, at 49. 
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the special needs test in Part III.A. An additional safeguard to the 
special needs test adopted by the Supreme Court is set out in Part 
III.B. Part III.C depicts the application of the special needs test in 
the context of mandatory DNA extractions for the purpose of anal­
ogy to familial searches. This is followed by Part IV, which ana­
lyzes the constitutionality of a familial search. Specifically, Part 
IY.A maintains that a family member has standing to bring a 
Fourth Amendment claim against the government and Part IV.B 
argues that familial searches are unreasonable governmental intru­
sions. Finally, this Note concludes that familial searches are 
unconstitutional. 
I. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON DNA 
A. 	 The Combined DNA Index System Program: Its Composition 
and Inner Workings 
In 1990, the FBI began a pilot program called CODIS.6 Ac­
cording to the FBI, CODIS is primarily a crime-solving tool.7 
CODIS has three tiers: national (NDIS), state, and local.8 The 
DNA profiles begin at the local level and flow upward to the higher 
levels.9 NDIS is the highest tier in the CODIS program,lO with the 
state and local levels sharing information with the national tier.ll 
The CODIS program has two indices: forensic and offender.12 
Working together, the indices help to create investigatory leadsP 
Biological evidence collected from a crime scene is stored in the 
forensic index and individuals' DNA profiles are stored in the of­
6. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Combined DNA Index System, at 1, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/pdf/codisbrochure.pdf [hereinafter Combined DNA Index 
System]. In 2000, the DNA Act was passed by Congress. It provides that DNA belong­
ing to certain offenders may be extracted, collected, and analyzed by the government. 
DNA Act, 42 U.S.c. § 14,135 (2000). 
7. Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 1. The FBI's use of CODIS 
has assisted in solving tough crimes. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Recent CODIS 
Success Stories, http://www.fbi.gov/success.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) (reporting 
that Wayne DuMond, on parole for rape in Arkansas, was arrested and convicted for 
the murder of Carol Shields in September 2001 based on DNA evidence found under 
her fingernails and stored in the NDIS database-notwithstanding the fact that the 
crime scene was meticulously cleaned). The same FBI report states that CODIS solved 
the oldest believed "cold" case-the 1968 murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, Linda 
Harmon, of San Francisco. Id. 




12. Id. at 1. 
13. Id. 
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fender index. These profiles are collected pursuant to state and 
federal statutes that allow the authorities to extract, store, and ana­
lyze DNA of convicts, probationers, parolees, and arrestees.14 The 
majority of DNA profiles stored in NDIS are those of convicted 
felons who have served time for crimes such as assault and battery, 
rape, murder, and robbery.15 The evidence stored in the forensic 
index is run in CaDIS against the offender index to find a match 
between the biological evidence and a particular offender.16 If 
there is a match to a convict, the police consider him to be a good 
suspect.17 
According to the FBI, 59,600 investigations have been aided by 
CaDIS between 1990 and October 2007.18 Also as of October 
2007, the total number of DNA profiles stored in NDIS was 
5,265,258, of which 194,785 were forensic profiles and 5,070,473 
were convicted offender profiles.t9 
B. DNA: A Complex and Powerful Crime-Solving Tool 
Given its unique ability to identify people, DNA has become a 
priceless tool for law enforcement in solving crimes.2o DNA, for­
mally known as deoxyribonucleic acid?1 is the fundamental build­
ing block of an individual's entire genetic makeup.22 While DNA is 
highly complex, it is generally described as follows: 
DNA is a double-helix shaped nucleic acid held together by hy­
drogen bonds and composed of base pairings of Adenine and 
Thymine and Cytosine and Guanine, which repeat along the 
double-helix at different regions (referred to as short-tandem-re­
14. [d. 
15. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Science and Technology in the Name of Justice, 
Part 2: FBI DNA Database Passes an Important Milestone, http://www.fbLgov/page2/ 
feb04/codis020304.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
16. See Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 1. 
17. Editorial, Use the Tools: With Proper Safeguards, Use of DNA Matching Can 
Be Expanded, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Aug. 28, 2006 [hereinafter Use the Tools], 
available at 2006 WLNR 14894295 (Westlaw). 
18. CaDIS-Measuring Success, http://www.fbLgov/hq/lab/codis/success.htm 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
19. CaDIS-Statistical Clickable Map, NDIS Statistics, http://www.fbLgovlhq/ 
lab/codis/c1ickmap.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
20. See Use the Tools, supra note 17. 
21. Henry T. Greely et ai., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to 
Catch Offenders' Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006). 
22. Dep't of Justice, What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know About 
DNA Evidence: What Is DNA?, http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/DNAbro/what.html (last vis­
ited Dec. 23, 2007) [hereinafter What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know]. 
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peat loci, or STR loci). When analyzed, these STR loci reveal 
the presence of various alleles, genic variants responsible for pro­
ducing a particular trait, that represent themselves differently in 
virtually everyone except identical twins, who share the same 
DNA.23 
DNA can be found, for example, in a person's blood, hair, and 
tissue.24 Forensic DNA evidence can be found on a weapon or any 
item that has touched a person's body, such as a hairbrush, tooth­
brush, or under someone else's fingernails.25 
Even DNA that is decades old can be used to solve crimes or 
rule out suspects, though the quality of DNA can be compromised 
by several factors.26 Just as officers have been trained to collect 
fingerprints from a crime scene, they now test for DNA evidence, 
which may be invisible to the naked eye, but is nonetheless helpful 
in solving the crime.27 The power of forensic DNA found at a crime 
scene is immense because it can not only destroy a suspect's alibi by 
proving that the suspect was at the scene of a crime, but it can also 
show the manner in which the crime was committed.2s For exam­
ple, it may prove that the suspect held the weapon.29 
When a familial search is conducted, DNA collected from a 
crime scene that produces a near-match hit to a convict can deter­
mine if the suspect is a relative of that convict.3D While complete 
strangers might share a few common alleles,31 the chance that two 
23. Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations 
omitted). 
24. What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know, supra note 22 ("DNA is 
... in blood, semen, skin cells, tissue, organs, muscle, brain cells, bone, teeth, hair, 
saliva, mucus, perspiration, fingernails, urine, feces, etc."). 
25. President's DNA Initiative, Identifying DNA Evidence, http://www.dna.gov/ 
audiences/investigatorslknow/identifying (last visited Dec. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Identi­
fying DNA Evidence] (citing a variety of examples where DNA can be found, including 
a baseball bat or other weapon, hat, facemask, eyeglasses, cotton swab, toothpick, used 
cigarette, stamp, envelope, tape, bottle, glass, used condom, blanket, pillow, sheet, 
through and through bullet, bite mark, fingernail, etc.). 
26. What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know, supra note 22 (warning 
that factors such as "heat, sunlight, moisture, bacteria, and mold" can destroy DNA). 
New software has been created that claims to help interpret DNA which was previously 
unusable because of poor quality. BBC News, New DNA Test to Solve More Cases, 
Oct. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2Ihiluk_news/england/5404402.stm (last visited Dec. 
24,2007). 
27. What Every Law Enforcement Officer Should Know, supra note 22. 
28. See Identifying DNA Evidence, supra note 25. 
29. Id. 
30. Greely et aI., supra note 21, at 251. 
31. Id. at 252. An allele is "any of the alternative forms of a gene that may occur 
at a given locus." MERRIAM-WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICIlONARY 32 (11th ed. 2003). 
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unrelated people share thirteen alleles in common is "infinitesi­
mal."32 Parents, siblings, and children generally share at least one­
half of the same alleles.33 Relatives of further degree, such as 
aunts, uncles, grandparents, grandchildren, and half-siblings share 
one-quarter of the same alleles.34 Relatives of even further degree, 
such as cousins, great-grandparents, and great-grandchildren share 
one-eighth of the same alleles.35 The danger is when a near-match 
hit is produced the law enforcement authorities will arbitrarily gen­
erate a suspect pool based on the convict's family members, which 
implicates privacy concerns. 
C. The Pros and Cons of CODIS 
Because DNA is such a powerful tool, the DNA stored in 
CaDIS has been extremely beneficial to society.36 It has helped to 
solve crimes and also to clear suspects of charges.37 Our criminal 
justice system is imperfect and sometimes innocent people are in­
carcerated while true criminals remain free.38 CaDIS has been 
used to free some of the innocent people who have been wrongly 
convicted.39 Death-row inmates' lives have been spared based on 
postconviction DNA testing.40 The innocence Project reports that 
212 people in the United States have been exonerated based on 
DNA evidence.41 Since 1973, 126 defendants on death row have 
32. Greely et aI., supra note 21, at 250. 
33. Id. at 251-52. 
34. Id. at 252. 
35. Id. 
36. See Use the Tools, supra note 17. 
37. Am. Soc'y of Law, Med. & Ethics, DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties 
Project, http://www.aslme.orgldna_04/description.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2007) [here­
inafter DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project]. 
38. Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, http://www.innocence 
project.orglunderstand (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). Some of the factors leading to false 
convictions are: false confessions, bad lawyering, microscopic hair comparison, defec­
tive or fraudulent science, prosecutorial misconduct, and mistaken identification. Id. 
Dennis Maher of Massachusetts was wrongly convicted and sentenced to life imprison­
ment for rape, assault with intent to rape, assault and battery, and aggravated rape in 
1984. Innocence Project, Dennis Maher, http://www.innocenceproject.orglContentl205. 
php (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). Maher was a sergeant in the U.S. Army at the time. 
After nineteen years of imprisonment, he was exonerated-the real perpetrator has not 
been discovered. Id. 
39. Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www. 
innocenceproject.orglContentl351.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
40. Innocence Project, Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.orgl 
aboutlMission-Statement.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
41. Id. "DNA testing has been a major factor in changing the criminal justice 
system. It has provided scientific proof that our system convicts and sentences innocent 
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been exonerated.42 Further, DNA profiling has assisted families in 
locating the remains of their loved ones killed in the terrorist at­
tacks of September 11, 2001, and gaining some measure of 
closure.43 
On the other hand, the storage of DNA in CODIS has also 
been criticized based upon privacy concerns. Commentators argue 
that the mass storage of DNA is a breach of privacy, especially 
given the personal information that the DNA may contain.44 For 
example, it may reveal information about whether a person has a 
genetic disorder or a predisposition to disease.45 It could indicate 
whether a person has a propensity for addiction to drugs or alcohol 
or other traits that could be used by the police to profile individu­
als.46 In addition, if a list of individuals that have DNA stored in 
COD IS is released to third parties, the mere fact that their DNA is 
in CaDIS might have adverse effects for those individuals.47 
D. New Developments in the Use of DNA Profiling 
The FBI is in charge of the national tier of CODIS and the 
sharing of information between the states.48 When a state is unable 
people ...." Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocence 
project.org/about (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). The Innocence Project, located at the 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, was founded by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. 
Neufeld in 1992. Id. 
42. Innocence and the Death Penalty, http;llwww.deathpenaltyinfo.orgiartic1e. 
php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). Unfortunately, some people die in 
prison before they are exonerated. Samuel R. Gross et aI., Exonerations in the United 
States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005) (noting 
"four cases where states posthumously acknowledged the innocence of defendants who 
had already died in prison"). 
43. See DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project, supra note 37. Joan 
Greener of Salem, Massachusetts, received news in September 2006 that her niece's 
remains-as a victim of September ll-were finally identified due to DNA results. 
Amy Westfeldt, Discovery of More 9/11 Remains Proves Tough for Some Families, IN­
TELLIGENCER (N.Y.), Nov. 12, 2006, at All, available at 2006 WLNR 19874534 
(Westlaw). The news brought sad emotions, but ultimately, Greener was glad the dis­
covery was made. Id. 
44. See, e.g., Gregory D. Kesich, DNA Use at Issue in Murder Case: The Lawyer 
for the Man Accused of Killing Crystal Perry Says Taking Sample Was Unconstitutional, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Oct. 20, 2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 18240747 
(Westlaw) (noting the potential to invade a person's privacy). 
45. DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project, supra note 37. 
46. /d. 
47. See id. (predicting that the mere knowledge that an individual's DNA is 
stored in CaDIS might persuade adoption agencies, insurance companies, and employ­
ers to avoid dealing with the individual based on a preconceived notion that the individ­
ual is a criminal). 
48. Hansen, supra note 5, at 49. 
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to obtain a match in its database, it can search the national database 
to find a match.49 In the past, if the state found a hit in the national 
database, the FBI would only share the identifying information if 
there was an exact match.50 In other words, the FBI would not re­
lease the identity of an individual if the hit produced only a near 
match.51 However, on July 14, 2006, the FBI adopted a new policy 
of allowing information about the near-match hits to be released.52 
The practice of using familial searches to obtain near-match hits to 
investigate family members of convicts who have DNA stored in 
CODIS will expand the use of the database beyond its original 
purpose.53 
Some criminologists say that familial searches will intrude on 
the privacy of family members.54 It is "genetic surveillance" of in­
nocent relatives 55 that will transform them into criminal suspects.56 
On the other hand, law enforcement officials argue that a near­
match hit only produces a "lead" that should be pursued in an in­
vestigation.57 They say that it is the equivalent of an eyewitness 
reporting to the police that the suspect looked and sounded exactly 
like Joe Smith, but it is much more reliable than an eyewitness.58 
49. See id. A "match" or "hit" occurs when the DNA stored in the forensic index 
is the same as the DNA in stored in the offender index. COD IS, National DNA Index 
System, http://www.fhLgov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
50. Hansen, supra note 5, at 49. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. In Colorado, the police ran a search through NDIS to identify a rapist 
who beat his victim so badly that she had to have her eye surgically removed. Id. at 48. 
The search produced only a near-match hit to a man in Oregon. Id. The police be­
lieved that the near-match hit strongly suggested that a relative of the Oregon man was 
the rapist, and if they could prove that the relative was in Denver at the time of the 
rape, the crime was as good as solved. Id. However, because FBI policy did not allow 
information to be released when a match was not exact, the FBI initially refused to 
reveal the Oregon man's name. Id. at 49. After some persistence, the FBI changed its 
policy and released the Oregon man's name to the police in Colorado. /d. 
53. Use the Tools, supra note 17. 
54. Sally Lehrman, Partial to Crime: Families Become Suspects as Rules on DNA 
Matches Relax, SCI. AM., Dec. 1, 2006, at 28, available at 2006 WLNR 22637249 
(Westlaw). 
55. Richard Willing, DNA Database Can Flag Suspects Through Relatives: Critics 
Fear 'Genetic Surveillance' of Innocent, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 2006, at 2A [hereinafter 
DNA Database Can Flag Suspects], available at 2006 WLNR 14577582 (Westlaw); A 
Not So Perfect Match, supra note 4. 
56. See DNA Database Can Flag Suspects, supra note 55. 
57. Id. 
58. Use the Tools, supra note 17. 
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The United Kingdom routinely uses a "familial searching tech­
nique" in its National DNA Database and has enjoyed success.59 In 
the United States, it is estimated that the use of familial searches on 
a national level could significantly increase the chances of finding 
criminals through DNA-potentially thousands of additional iden­
tifications.60 In at least one case in the United States, the familial 
search has already solved a crime and exonerated a wrongly con­
victed man.61 After being incarcerated for eighteen years, Darryl 
Hunt was freed when DNA from the crime scene was tested and a 
search in CODIS revealed the brother of the real killer.62 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 

A PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 

AND SEIZURES BY THE GOVERNMENT 

A. The Fourth Amendment's Origin and Goals 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be se­
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasona­
ble governmental searches and seizures.63 The Fourth Amendment 
was adopted to gain independence from the general warrants and 
warrantless searches that were imposed by Britain upon the colo­
nists.64 It was adopted to protect citizens' privacy and dignity from 
59. See Brenda Hickman, Rapist Faces Justice 20 Years On, NEWCASTLE EVENING 
CHRON., Sept. 19,2006, at 21, available at 2006 WLNR 16243486 (Westlaw) (describing 
the account of a rape victim whose attacker was caught twenty years later by use of the 
familial searching technique). The technology was touted as "pioneering," and "cutting 
edge." Id. 
60. Randolph E. Schmid, Relatives' DNA Could Help Find Criminals: But Such 
Searches Involve Ethics Issues, Some Experts Say, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 14, 2006, 
at A28, available at 2006 WLNR 8272064 (WestIaw) (addressing Frederick R. Bieber's 
estimate that "in a case in which there is a 10 percent chance of finding a criminal 
through a DNA search, expanding the search to suspects' close relatives could raise the 
chances to 14 percent," which potentially represents thousands of additional 
identifications). 
61. Suzanne Smalley, A Man Wrongly Accused Becomes a Symbol of Hope, Bos­
TON GLOBE, May 12, 2006, at A5, available at 2006 WLNR 8172556 (Westlaw). 
62. Id. 
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
64. British customs officers conducted general exploratory searches using general 
writs of assistance against the American colonists between 1761 and 1776. PHILLIP A. 
HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH AMENDMENT 
HANDBOOK 77 (2005). General warrants have been described as "'the worst instru­
ment of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental 
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book,' because they placed 'the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.'" Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 
476,481 (1965) (quoting James Otis). The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend­
ment was not adopted to shield criminals. Instead, the Fourth Amendment was 
553 2008) GUILT BY RELATION 
arbitrary governmental intrusion.65 
Although the Fourth Amendment protects one of our greatest 
and most fundamental individual rights, this right has been cur­
tailed, at various times, by the government to protect the broader 
interests of the public.66 This is especially true of convicts' rights.67 
Although the statutorily mandated extraction and analysis of a con­
vict's DNA is a search and seizure for Fourth Amendment pur­
poses,68 the practice has been held to be reasonable in light of a 
governmental "special need" that outweighs the convict's expecta­
tion of privacy.69 If the FBI's new policy of allowing states to share 
adopted in response to colonists' memories of abuse from unreasonable governmental 
searches and seizures due to general warrants and warrantless searches. Chimel v. Cali­
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 
(1948». Abuses such as these were considered to be a major cause of the American 
Revolution. Id. 
65. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (citing 
Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967»; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) 
("The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to pre­
vent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and 
personal security of individuals."). 
66. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 5. 
67. When this Note refers to "convicts," the term shall also generally include pro­
bationers, parolees, and supervised releasees, unless specifically stated otherwise. Al­
though there are technical differences among the legal status of these individuals, the 
term "convicts" will be used for the sake of simplicity. 
68. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (stating that a "physical intrusion, pene­
trating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable" and "[t)he ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain 
physiological data is a further invasion"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 
(1966) (commenting that "if compulsory administration of a blood test does not impli­
cate the Fifth Amendment, it plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 
261,264 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that "[a)ny forced extraction of blood ... invades 
one's expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, and its reasonableness must be ad­
judged under a Fourth Amendment analysis"). 
69. See United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the 
special need was to procure reliable identifying information, reduce recidivism, and 
protect communities); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding 
that the special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to assist in solving 
crimes); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the special need 
was to create a reliable identification for storing in the database to solve past and future 
crimes); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding the spe­
cial need was to create a DNA-indexing database); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (finding that the special need was to reduce and prevent the recidivism rate). 
But see United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(holding that the purported special need was merely regular law enforcement pur­
poses), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 
2007). For the purposes of this Note, Weikert I will refer to the district court's opinion 
and Weikert II will refer to the opinion by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
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near-match DNA hits is challenged, opponents may argue that the 
practice violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the family mem­
bers, just as convicts have argued that the extraction and analysis of 
DNA constitutes a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.7° 
B. 	 The Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Its Requirements 
The Fourth Amendment refers to "searches and seizures."71 
But according the Supreme Court, a person can be illegally 
searched absent a seizure, just as a person can have an item illegally 
seized, absent an illegal search.72 The right to be free from a search 
and seizure protects two separate and individual expectations and 
interests.73 An illegal search intrudes upon a person's individual 
privacy interest, while an illegal seizure divests a person of control 
of his property.74 This Note focuses on the legality of the familial 
search and does not address the seizure issue because a person has 
no possessory interest in a family member's DNA. 




Before a Fourth Amendment violation occurs, a person must 
have standing to make such a claim.75 For standing to be satisfied, 
the person complaining must be subjected to the search,76 the 
search must be recognized under the Fourth Amendment,77 and the 
70. Defendants have overwhelmingly lost the battle against the forced extractions 
of DNA. See Conley, 453 F.3d at 674; United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th 
Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489,491 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas, 430 F.3d 
at 655; United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 
401 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Green, 354 F.3d at 679; Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413­
14 (5th Cir. 2004); Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1134; Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 74; Jones v. Murray, 
962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992); Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 1. But see Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 
2d at 282. 
71. 	 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
72. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-21 (1984) (holding that no 
search occurred when federal agents examined a powdery substance found in a dam­
aged box opened by Federal Express employees because the defendant had no expecta­
tion of privacy in the box; however, the federal agents' control over the packages was a 
seizure). 
73. 	 Id. at 113. 
74. 	 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). 
75. 	 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978). 
76. 	 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 (1969). 
77. A Fourth Amendment search is recognized when a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy against the search that society is willing to accept as reasonable. 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). The Supreme Court has held that a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas of his person that are not 
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search must constitute an invasion by the government,78 A Fourth 
Amendment search is recognized when a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy against the search that society is willing to 
accept as reasonable.79 If anyone of these elements is not met, a 
Fourth Amendment claim will fai1.80 
The Fourth Amendment lists the items that it protects against 
unreasonable searches seizures. These include a person and his 
home, papers, and effects.81 However, the Fourth Amendment 
does not fully speak to standing. Three Supreme Court cases artic­
open to public view. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For example, a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his pockets, inner clothing, deep lung 
breaths, urine, and blood. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 68 (2001) (hold­
ing that testing of urine is a search); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 
602, 603 (1989) (holding that breath tests involving deep lung breaths constitute a 
search); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (holding that scraping under the 
defendant's fingernails was a search); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (hold­
ing that going through a person's pockets and inner clothing is a search protected 
against by the Fourth Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968) (holding 
that there is a search when law enforcement pats down a person's outer clothing); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (holding that taking a person's blood 
from his body is a search). Significantly, courts have recognized that a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA under the Fourth Amendment. Sehmer­
ber, 384 U.S. at 767; see United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Mass. 
2007); United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262 (D. Mass. 2006), 
rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007); see 
also United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 
451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 
2005); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kincade, 379 
F.3d 813, 821 n.15 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411,413 
(5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. 
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 
1992). Outside of the context of the Fourth Amendment, it has been held that a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his medical records and against disclosure of 
personal matters. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (2d Cir. 
1980) ("[I]nformation about one's body and state of health is a matter which the indi­
vidual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may lead a 
private life.'" (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.3d 566, 581-82 (1956»; Com­
monwealth v. West, 834 A.2d 625, 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
78. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 10-12. The Fourth Amendment applies to the 
federal government. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Federal government employees are subject to 
Fourth Amendment application. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bu­
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). States and their employees, as well as coun­
ties and municipalities, also fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Stanford 
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
79. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
80. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 11-12. 
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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ulate the standing requirement: Katz v. United States,82 Minnesota 
v. 	Olson,83 and Kyllo v. United States.84 
The scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection was best set 
forth in Katz v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amend­
ment protects people, not places.85 In Katz, the defendant was con­
victed of transmitting bets over the telephone, which was a 
violation of a federal statute.86 The FBI used an electronic listening 
device placed on the outside of a public phone booth to listen to the 
defendant's side of the conversation.87 The use of the electronic 
listening device and the recording was held to be an unreasonable 
search and seizure in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amend­
ment rights.88 The defendant was found to have a reasonable ex­
pectation of privacy in the phone booth.89 The fact that a phone 
booth is not specifically listed in the Fourth Amendment was not 
dispositive. This is because it is the person's expectation of privacy 
that is protected, not the place.90 The test was set out in Justice 
82. 	 Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
83. 	 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
84. 	 Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27. 
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The rule before Katz was that, to be protected, the 
thing searched must have been material, such as a person, house, paper, or effect. Olm­
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and 
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in 
Olmstead, noted that, when analyzing the Constitution, society should not merely focus 
on the evils that were in the minds of the Framers when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted, but that society must also look to the future to address the evils that may 
become. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Otherwise, the principles will be impo­
tent and valueless. Id. Furthermore, Justice Brandeis took issue with the majority's 
position that only searches of material things could be constitutionally protected. Id. at 
478-79. Justice Brandeis suggested a much broader reading of the Fourth Amendment 
when he stated, 
The protection guaranteed by the Amendment[ 1is much broader in scope. 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to 
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and 
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be 
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi­
lized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Govern­
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must 
be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 478. 
86. 	 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
87. 	 Id. 
88. 	 Id. at 353. 
89. 	 Id. at 352. 
90. 	 Id. at 351-52. 
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Harlan's concurring opinion: In order to implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, a person must have a subjective expectation of pri­
vacy in the thing or area searched, and that expectation must be 
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "91 
In Minnesota v. Olson,92 the Supreme Court provided further 
clarification that the Fourth Amendment protects people not 
places. In Olson, the police suspected the defendant's involvement 
in a robbery, which ultimately resulted in the death of a store man­
ager.93 While the police were searching for Olson, they learned 
that he was staying at his friend's home.94 Without a warrant, the 
police entered the home and found Olson hiding in a closet.95 The 
police arrested Olson and brought him to the police station, where 
he made an inculpatory statement.96 Although the house was not 
his home, Olson claimed that he had an expectation of privacy 
while he was in the house, and therefore the warrantless entry, ab­
sent exigent circumstances, violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.97 
The Supreme Court held that Olson had a legitimate expecta­
tion of privacy in his friend's home.98 Again, this reflects the under­
standing that the Fourth Amendment's protection expands beyond 
the physical person, home, papers, and effects because it is the per­
son whose interests are truly protected by the Fourth Amend­
ment.99 This is true as long as the person has manifested an 
expectation of privacy in the area searched that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable.1°o 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed an in­
vasion of privacy in light of new technology and the reasonableness 
of an expectation of privacy under the circumstances.101 The case 
examined "whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a 
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat 
within the home constituted a 'search' within the meaning of the 
91. [d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
92. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
93. [d. at 93. 
94. [d. at 94. 
95. /d. 
96. [d. 
97. See id. at 94-95. 
98. See id. 
99. [d. at 96 n.5. 
100. [d. at 95-96. 
101. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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Fourth Amendment."102 Law enforcement officers suspected that 
the defendant was growing marijuana in his house, which would re­
quire the use of strong heat lamps.103 Without a warrant, in the 
dark, early morning hours, the officers used a thermal imager to 
detect a high level of heat emanating from the home, which they 
could not have seen without the use of the technology.lo4 The ther­
mal images quickly revealed that an unusually high amount of heat 
was coming from over the garage. lOS The officers obtained a war­
rant based on the thermal image readings, unusually high electric 
bills, and informant tips.106 Officers found approximately one hun­
dred marijuana plants in the defendant's home. lo7 The defendant 
was indicted for manufacturing marijuana after unsuccessfully at­
tempting to suppress the marijuana evidence found in the home. lOB 
The government's main argument was that the search was con­
stitutional because Kyllo could not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when the government did not actually physically in­
truded into his home and the technology did not reveal any inti­
mate details of the home. lo9 The Supreme Court held that a Fourth 
Amendment violation can occur absent an actual physical intrusion 
and rejected the "intimate details" argument.1 lO However, the rule 
regarding physical intrusion is limited. An unconstitutional intru­
sion is found, in the context of new technology, if the information 
collected could not have been obtained without an actual physical 
intrusion, without the use of the technology-at least to the extent 
that the technology is not available for use to the general public.lll 
To better explain this, the police in Kyllo would have had to make 
an actual physical intrusion into the home to find the marijuana 
evidence if they did not have the new and publicly unavailable ther­
mal imaging technology.112 Therefore, if the actual physical intru­
sion into the home would have been an unconstitutional invasion, 
so would the invasion that lacked the actual "physical" intrusive­
102. Id. at 29. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 29-30. 




109. See id. at 30-3I. 
110. Id. at 34. 
l1I. /d. 
112. See id. 
559 2008] 	 GUILT BY RELATION 
ness-only made capable by the new technology.113 On the other 
hand, if the thermal imaging technology was readily available to the 
general public, then the intrusion would not be unconstitutional be­
cause the searched person had no legitimate expectation of privacy 
given the public's access to the technology.114 This case exemplifies 
the Supreme Court's concern with technological advances imping­
ing on individuals' rights to privacy. 
The lesson learned from the three cases discussed above is that 
the standing requirement is satisfied if the government conducts a 
search that invades an individual's subjective expectation of privacy 
and that expectation of privacy is one that society would deem rea­
sonable.H5 Although a person, his home, papers, and effects are 
explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment,116 the Fourth 
Amendment's protections extend further and do not require an ac­
tual invasion of these things.117 It is the subjective expectation of 
an individual's privacy that is protected, so long as it is also objec­
tively reasonable.118 
2. 	 A Search Must Be Unreasonable to Constitute a Fourth 
Amendment Violation 
Once a person satisfies the standing requirement, the next is­
sue is whether the search was reasonable. If the search is found to 
be unreasonable, then a Fourth Amendment violation has oc­
curred.119 But if the search is reasonable, then no Fourth Amend­
ment violation has occurred.120 
The Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement offi­
cials obtain a warrant through judicial approval, whenever practica­
ble. l2l An individual's privacy interest is deemed so precious that 
an objective person should decide whether or not to invade the in­
terest, and not a person whose job it is to solve crimes.122 For a 
113. [d. 
114. [d. 
115. E.g., id. at 33. 
116. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
117. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[O]nce it is recognized that 
the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable 
searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn 
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."). 
118. E.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. 
119. HUBBART, supra note 64, at 12. 
120. [d. 
121. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968). 
122. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
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warrant to be issued, there must be "probable cause."123 In some 
instances, a search can be conducted without a warrant; however, it 
usually must be based on probable cause or a showing of individual­
ized suspicion of wrongdoing.124 Otherwise, the search is consid­
ered unreasonable.125 In very limited circumstances, a search can 
even be considered constitutionally reasonable without individual­
ized suspicion.126 This important exception is called the "special 
needs exception," which occurs when the government has a special 
need that is "beyond the normal need for law enforcement."127 
This exception dispenses with the need for a warrant, probable 
cause, and even individualized suspicion for searches involving, for 
example, public schools, government agencies, and prisons.128 
III. TREATMENT OF A SEARCH OR SEIZURE ABSENT AN 

INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION OF WRONGDOING: 

THE SPECIAL NEEDS TEST 

A. 	 Introduction to the Special Needs Test-Eliminating the 
Typical Requirements: Warrant, Probable Cause, and 
Individualized Suspicion 
Ordinarily, law enforcement officials are required to have a 
warrant, probable cause, or in some instances, individualized suspi­
cion of criminal wrongdoing in order to conduct a constitutional 
search.129 However, the Supreme Court developed the special 
123. 	 u.s. CONST. amend. IV. 
124. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (defining individualized 
suspicion as "a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make 
the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable"). Usually the Fourth 
Amendment requires probable cause; however, "a lesser degree satisfies the Constitu­
tion when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard 
reasonable. . . . The same circumstances that lead to the conclusion that reasonable 
suspicion is constitutionally sufficient also render a warrant requirement unnecessary." 
Id. The Fourth Amendment focuses on the warrant requirement and reasonableness of 
the search to guard against arbitrary governmental intrusions. Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,621-22 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 
(1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967). 
125. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
126. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997). 
127. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 653 (1995». 
128. Id.; see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471,515 U.S. 646 (public schools); Nat'l Treasury 
Empl. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (government agencies); T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325 (public schools). 
129. 	 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471, 515 U.S. at 653. 
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needs test to determine whether a search is reasonable without a 
warrant, probable cause, or suspicion of individual wrongdoing.130 
The "special needs test," which carves out an exception to the 
normal requirements of a warrant, probable cause, and individual­
ized suspicion, was first articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O.l3l In 
T. L. 0., a fourteen-year-old girl was caught smoking in her school 
bathroom.132 The assistant vice-principal searched through the 
girl's purse and found cigarettes and rolling papers.133 Based on his 
experience that rolling papers were used to smoke marijuana, he 
was suspicious and continued his search of her purse more thor­
oughly,134 He found marijuana, among other incriminating evi­
dence,135 T.L.O. claimed that the search of her purse was a 
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights,136 The Court applied a 
balancing test: "the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy 
and personal security" versus "the government's need for effective 
methods to deal with breaches of public order."137 Although the 
Court found that school children do have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, the Court rejected the warrant and probable cause re­
quirements in light of the government's strong need to maintain or­
der in schools.138 
The concurring opinions added additional light to formulation 
of the special needs test. Justice Blackmun said that the balancing 
test should only reduce the warrant and probable cause require­
ments of the Fourth Amendment when there is "a special law en­
forcement need for greater flexibility," which makes the 
requirements "impracticable."139 Further, as Justice Powell stated, 
children at school have a lower expectation of privacy than the gen­
eral public because school personnel have authority over the 
schoolchildren, much like parents.140 Justice Blackmun believed 
that the need for an immediate response by school officials, the 
schools' significant duty to protect the students, and the students' 
130. [d. 
131. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. 




136. [d. at 329. 
137. [d. at 337. 
138. [d. at 337-41. 
139. [d. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491,514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
140. [d. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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lowered expectation of privacy justified dispensing with the warrant 
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.141 
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, the Court offi­
cially adopted the special needs test and eliminated the warrant, 
probable cause, and individualized suspicion requirements in cer­
tain circumstances.142 It determined that a federal regulation man­
dating urine and blood testing of railroad employees was not a 
violation of the employees' Fourth Amendment rights under the 
special needs test.143 According to the Court, the testing was justi­
fied by the number of accidents due to employees' alcohol and drug 
use.144 The special need was to put an end to railroad accidents and 
loss of human life due to employees' use of alcohol or drugs, not to 
gather evidence for the prosecution of the employees,14s It also 
noted the deterrent value of the regulation to keep employees clean 
and sober,146 
B. 	 The Primary Purpose and Immediate Objective of the Special 
Need Must Go Beyond Typical Law Enforcement 
Purposes 
The Supreme Court again applied the special needs test in City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond when it held that a checkpoint program 
designed to discover illegal drugs was unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.147 The Court acknowledged that certain types 
of "suspicionless" searches and seizures are constitutional if the 
"program [is] designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement."'148 However, the drug interdiction pro­
gram in Edmond had a "primary purpose . . . to uncover evidence 
of ordinary criminal wrongdoing" and was, therefore, unconstitu­
tional,149 In making its decision, the Court noted that it had never 
upheld a program that was designed specifically to detect criminal 
wrongdoing. ISO For instance, the Court recalled invalidating a sus­
picionless search that was conducted merely to check a driver's li­
141. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
142. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
143. Id. at 634. 
144. Id. at 606-07. 
145. Id. at 620-22. 
146. Id. at 629. 
147. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000). 
148. Id. at 37 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 
(1995». 
149. Id. at 41-42. 
150. Id. at 38. 
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cense and registration on the grounds that the officer's discretion to 
stop was "'standardless and unconstrained.' "151 In contrast, the 
Court recounted upholding a checkpoint program "aimed [to re­
duce] the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers 
on the highways, [since] there was an obvious connection between 
the imperative of highway safety and the law enforcement practice 
at issue."152 Accordingly, a search can be deemed reasonable even 
absent an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but only if it is 
clear that the primary purpose of the activity serves a special need 
beyond that of general law enforcement, and that its purpose is not 
solely to obtain general evidence of criminal wrongdoing.153 
Another case which helped to clarify the special needs test was 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston.154 In this case, a hospital program 
forced pregnant women suspected of drug use to submit to urine 
tests to determine if they were in fact taking illegal drugs while 
pregnant.155 The Supreme Court considered the searches to be sus­
picionless and, as a result, it applied the special needs test.156 The 
Court cautioned that when applying the special needs test, the "im­
mediate objective" of the search should be a consideration and not 
the "ultimate purpose" of the search.157 Even if the end goal of the 
testing was to assist pregnant drug users to get treatment, the imme­
diate objective was to obtain evidence of the drug use and to give it 
to law enforcement in order to effectuate that end goal.158 The 
Court reasoned that if the special needs test is viewed in light of the 
broad "ultimate purpose" rather than the narrow "immediate ob­
jective" of the search, every suspicionless search could be "immu­
nized under the special needs doctrine. "159 Therefore, to determine 
whether there is some special need beyond that of ordinary law en­
forcement that creates a valid exception to the warrant require­
ment, the focus must be on the immediate objective of the 
governmental intrusion rather than the ultimate purpose.160 
A more recent case dealing with the special needs of law en­
forcement is Illinois v. Lidster, which describes another example of 
151. Id. at 39 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979». 
152. Id. (citing Mich. Dep't. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990». 
153. See id. at 37-48. 
154. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
155. Id. at 70-73. 
156. Id. at 79. 
157. Id. at 84. 
158. /d. at 82-83. 
159. Id. at 84. 
160. Id. 
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a suspicionless search program.161 The police set up a checkpoint in 
response to a hit-and-run accident that left one person dead, which 
was designed to acquire information about the accident from mo­
torists who may have seen the hit-and-run.162 Approaching the 
checkpoint, Lidster, who was intoxicated, nearly hit an officer.163 
Lidster challenged the stop as an unlawful seizure.164 The Court 
did not reference the special needs test, but determined that the 
checkpoint had an information-seeking purpose, as opposed to the 
type of search conducted in Edmond, which was intended to con­
trol crime.165 The Court upheld the program as reasonable because 
the stop was in response to a "grave public concern" and minimally 
interfered with the motorists' liberty interests.166 The purpose of 
the stop was to seek information from motorists about a crime that 
was probably committed by someone other than those who were 
questioned.167 The Court reasoned that a vital part of police work 
is to ask for information from people.168 When there is a serious 
public need, a minimal intrusion of a person's liberty interest is out­
weighed if the governmental activity is designed to obtain informa­
tion from people who may have witnessed but not committed the 
crime,169 
C. 	 Application of the Special Needs Test to Mandatory DNA 
Extractions-United States v. Weikert 
The statutes mandating extraction of DNA from convicts for 
storage and analysis in CODIS have been challenged as requiring 
unconstitutional searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend­
ment,170 However, courts that have applied the special needs test 
161. 	 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
162. 	 Id. at 422. 
163. 	 Id. 
164. 	 Id. 
165. 	 !d. at 423. 
166. 	 Id. at 422, 427. 
167. 	 Id. at 423. 
168. 	 Id. at 425. 
169. 	 See id. at 426. 
170. See, e.g., United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2007), 
reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 
676 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 923 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson 
v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655 (2d 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 176 (3d Cir. 2005); Padgett v. Don­
ald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2005); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 412-13 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 
1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Jones v. 
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to these cases have ruled that the government's special needs out­
weigh the privacy interests of the convicts, and thus the statutes 
have been upheld as constitutional. l71 
Extraction and analysis of DNA is considered a search and 
seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment because "it is obvious 
that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes 
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable."l72 Not only is the extraction an intrusion into the 
body but it is also an intrusion into the individual's personal privacy 
and identity-especially since the information taken from the sam­
ple can be used in the futureY3 
However, as stated above, courts that have examined the issue 
under the special needs test have overwhelmingly held that forced 
DNA extractions on convicts are not unconstitutional because, not­
withstanding the constitutionally protected expectation of privacy 
in one's DNA, the search is reasonable under the special needs 
test.174 An obstacle under the special needs test that the courts 
have had to overcome is the "primary purpose/immediate objec­
tive" prong.175 The courts have found their way around this prong 
by citing special needs such as obtaining reliable identification, pro-
Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 303 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 
262 (D. Mass. 2007). 
171. Conley, 453 F.3d at 679 (finding that the special need was to procure reliable 
identifying information, reduce recidivism, and protect communities); Nicholas, 430 
F.3d at 668-69 (finding that the special need was to create a DNA-indexing database to 
assist in solving crimes); Green, 354 F.3d at 679 (finding that the special need was to 
create a reliable identification for storing in the database to solve past and future 
crimes); Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146 (finding the special need was to create a DNA-index­
ing database); Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 79 (finding that the special need was to reduce and 
prevent the recidivism rate). But see United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 
2d at 265 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that the purported special need was merely regular 
law enforcement purposes), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 
F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). There is also a line of cases that has analyzed the constitutional­
ity of the mandatory extraction of convicts' DNA under the totality of the circum­
stances test, as opposed to the special needs test. Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 3; Conley, 453 
F.3d at 680-81 (analyzing the issue under both the special needs and totality of the 
circumstances tests); Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924-25; Johnson, 440 F.3d at 496; Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d at 177; Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413; Jones, 962 F.2d at 308; Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 
2d at 269. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled specifically on the issue of whether 
familial DNA searches are constitutional. 
172. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
173. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
174. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668-69; Green, 354 F.3d at 679; Kimler, 335 F.3d at 
1146; Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 79. But see Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (holding that 
the purported special need was merely regular law enforcement purposes). 
175. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668-69; Green, 354 F.3d at 679; Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 
79. But see Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 265. 
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tecting communities,176 assisting in solving past and future 
crimes,177 creating a DNA-indexing database,118 and reducing and 
preventing recidivism.179 
In United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts considered the constitutionality of 
a statute mandating the extraction of a supervised releasee's 
DNA.180 Although the decision was recently reversed by the Court 
of Appeals in the First Circuit (Weikert II),181 both decisions are 
valuable resources to analogize to a familial search scenario. 
1. 	 Weikert I: Mandatory Extraction of DNA from a 
Supervised Releasee Is Examined Under the 
Special Needs Test 
After serving time for conspiracy to possess drugs with the in­
tent to distribute and for escape from prison, Weikert was granted 
supervised release.182 Upon release, Weikert was notified by the 
probation office that he was required to submit to a procedure for 
extracting his DNA, which would then be entered into CODIS.183 
In response, Weikert argued that such an extraction, absent a war­
rant or individualized suspicion, would violate his Fourth Amend­
ment rights.184 
Based on the three Supreme Court decisions discussed above, 
Edmond,185 Ferguson,186 and Lidster,187 Weikert I held that the spe­
cial needs test was the appropriate analysis188 because the reason 
for mandating extraction of Weikert's DNA was not based upon an 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.189 The court applied the 
176. See Conley, 453 F.3d at 679; Green, 354 F.3d at 679. 
177. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992). 
178. Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146. 
179. Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 82; Murray, 962 F.2d at 308. 
180. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
181. United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied 
en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
182. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 260-61. 
183. Id. at 261. 
184. Id. 
185. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
186. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
187. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
188. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
189. Id. The court distinguished its case from Griffin v. Wisconsin, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a reasonable suspicion justified the search of a probationer's 
horne without a warrant. Id. at 264-65 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 
(1987)). Because the Weikert I search was suspicionless, Griffin did not apply. 
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test, as set out by Justice Blackmun in T.L.O.,190 and asked 
whether, in this case, there was a special need beyond typical law 
enforcement purposes.191 Weikert I concluded that there was no 
special need that justified the compulsory extraction, storage, and 
analysis of DNA.192 Rather, the immediate purpose was to solve a 
crime that Weikert mayor may not have committed.193 
Weikert I also analyzed whether the government's purported 
special need outweighed Weikert's privacy interest. In examining 
the intrusion, the court stated that the initial blood extraction is an 
invasion of a person's privacy interest, and the storage of the infor­
mation derived from the extraction and later analysis thereof con­
stitutes an even greater invasion of the privacy interest at stake.194 
The court examined the scope of Weikert's privacy interest, as a 
supervised releasee.195 It explained that a supervised releasee does 
not have the same level of privacy interest as a law-abiding individ­
ual. The exact extent of the interest is a question that has been left 
unanswered.196 For instance, a person on supervised release may 
have his home searched while he is on probation even if the police 
have no search warrant and no probable cause, so long as there is 
adequate reasonable suspicion.197 The court found this analogy un­
helpful because an intrusion of a person's home is much different 
than that of his body,198 which deserves a higher expectation of pri­
vacy. Furthermore, to justify a governmental home invasion there 
must be a reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, as opposed 
to Weikert's circumstances where the DNA was being extracted 
merely because he was on supervised release and not because he 
was suspected of criminal wrongdoing.199 
190. See supra notes 129-139 and accompanying text. 
191. [d. at 264 (citing Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 664 n.22 (2d Cir. 2005». 
192. [d. at 265. 
193. /d. 
194. [d. at 266. 
195. [d. at 266-68. 
196. [d. at 266 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987), which stated 
that a person on supervised release may have a liberty interest conditioned on proba­
tionary rules, as opposed to an absolute liberty interest). 
197. [d. (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874). A probationary period is part of the 
sentence, and the person on supervised release can be sent back to prison for violating 
the conditions of the supervised release. [d. at 267. 
198. [d. at 266-67. 
199. [d. (defining the issue as "whether such individuals have a limited privacy 
interest in a suspicionless invasion into their body and their identity"). 
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The court then examined the privacy interests of a person in 
prison,20o and determined that a supervised releasee has a privacy 
interest falling somewhere between that of a law-abiding citizen 
and that of a prisoner-but closer to that of a law-abiding citizen.201 
For instance, after one year and upon a showing of good conduct, a 
supervised releasee can have the supervised release terminated if 
the termination is in the interest of justice; however, a prisoner's 
restricted expectation of privacy is limited to the prison cell.202 
Thus, the court found that a: supervised releasee's expectation of 
privacy is significant.203 . 
In weighing the interests of the individual's privacy right and 
the government's alleged special need, the court acknowledged the 
government's success rate of catching criminals due to the DNA­
indexing database.204 Where there is a great public interest at 
stake, suspicionless searches may be upheld.205 However, the court 
did not believe that the government's interests outweighed the ex­
treme bodily intrusion and resulting invasion of privacy that oc­
curred when DNA was stored in a centralized database.206 The 
court recognized that, in the future, the stored DNA may be found 
to contain trait coding.207 Further, if the DNA falls into the wrong 
hands it may be used for improper purposes, which would be a ma­
jor privacy concern.208 The intrusion occurred at various levels: the 
extraction, analysis, storage, and potential misuse of the DNA.209 
The court acknowledged that certain citizens have lowered ex­
pectations of privacy, such as a person who has been convicted, or a 
200. Id. at 267 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984), which held 
that a prisoner does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" from his prison cell 
being searched). 
201. Id. at 267-68. 
202. /d. at 267 (citing 18 U.S.c. § 3583(e)(I) (2000)). 
203. /d. at 268. 
204. Id. 
205. Id.; see, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 
(1989). The special needs test is invoked to "prevent the development of hazardous 
conditions or to detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for searching 
any particular place or person." Id. at 668; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' 
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that the government's interest in protecting 
against serious accidents justified the mandatory blood and urine testing); United States 
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (holding that searching vehicles at the 
country's borders without individualized suspicion was acceptable given the nation's 
interest in maintaining secure borders). 
206. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
207. Id. at 269. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
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person on supervised release.210 And yet, the court still believed 
that a person on supervised release has a privacy interest in his 
DNA that outweighs the government's interest in solving crimes,211 
especially in light of the severity of the intrusion.212 
2. Weikert II Reversed Weikert I But Limited Its Holding 
In Weikert II the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit re­
versed Weikert I and held that it is constitutional to extract and 
store the DNA of an individual on supervised release in CODIS 
under the DNA Act using the totality of the circumstances tesp13 
The First Circuit joined the majority of federal courts that use the 
totality of the circumstances test when examining challenges to laws 
that call for mandatory extraction of DNA.214 The totality of the 
circumstances test analyzes the reasonableness of a search by 
weighing the extent to which the search intrudes upon an individ­
ual's privacy and the extent to which the search is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.215 The court re­
jected the notion that the special needs test is the only test that may 
be applied when there is no individualized suspicion against an indi­
vidual.216 To support this proposition,217 it cited Sampson v. Cali­
fornia, which utilized the totality of the circumstances test to 
determine that an individual on conditioned release may be 
searched absent any individualized suspicion.218 Because the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Weikert II viewed Weikert's sta­
tus as a supervised releasee, the same as Sampson's status as a con­
210. [d. at 266-68. 
211. [d. at 270. 
212. [d. at 269. 
213. United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g 
denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
214. [d. at 8. The majority of courts use the totality of the circumstances test. See 
United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson v. Quander, 440 
F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 
2005); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kin­
cade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 
413-14 (5th Cir. 2004); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992). A minor­
ity of courts use the special needs test. See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 
n.6 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). 
215. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001). 
216. Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 8. 
217. [d. 
218. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 nA (2006). 
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ditioned releasee, it held that the totality of the circumstances test 
must apply.219 
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court 
weighed Weikert's interest in privacy against the government's in­
terest in conducting the search (i.e., extraction and storage of DNA 
in CODIS).220 Again, the court found that an individual on super­
vised release is like an individual on conditioned release, as in 
Sampson, and held that such an individual has a lower expectation 
of privacy by virtue of his status.221 It further found that the intru­
sion is minimal because the extraction of DNA does not include 
much risk.222 According to the court, the storage of DNA does not 
pose a risk unless the DNA information is released and improperly 
utilized by third parties and the DNA is found to be more than 
junk.223 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that the 
government has a strong interest in identifying, monitoring, and re­
habilitating criminals and in solving crimes.224 When balancing the 
parties' interests, the court concluded that the government's inter­
est outweighed Weikert's.225 
Limitations restrict Weikert II's holding, however.226 It applies 
only to individuals subject to the DNA Act and not free and law­
abiding citizens.227 Given that this Note does not focus on chal­
lenges to the DNA Act, but rather free and law-abiding family 
members, the appropriate analysis that this Note will utilize is the 
special needs test, as in Weikert I, as opposed to the totality of the 
circumstances test in Weikert II. It is also worth noting that the 
Weikert II court stated that it would reexamine the issue if the 
stored DNA is scientifically concluded to be more than just junk 
and is potentially, or consequently, misused.228 The court's conclu­
sion leaves the door open for further evaluation of the privacy im­
plications of CODIS. 
219. Weikert II, 504 F.3d at 9. 
220. Id. at 11-14. 
221. Id. at 11-12. 
222. Id. at 12-15. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 14. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 15-18. 
227. Id. at 15. 
228. Id. at 13. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 A Family Member Has Standing Because He Has a 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Against the 
Familial Search 
1. 	 The Fourth Amendment Should Be Broadly Interpreted 
to Include Common DNA 
The term "person" in the Fourth Amendment229 should not be 
narrowly construed to mean the actual person. Common or shared 
DNA is, in essence, a partial genetic makeup of the family mem­
ber's person. Rather, the term "person" should be construed more 
broadly to protect the family member so as to avoid the denial of 
the family member's reasonable expectation of privacy simply be­
cause the intrusion does not occur to his actual person.230 
The Fourth Amendment expressly protects "persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."231 
However, Katz v. United States, one of the most significant Fourth 
Amendment decisions, held that people-not places-are pro­
tected by the Fourth Amendment.232 Katz overturned Olmstead v. 
United States ,233 which read the Constitution more narrowly, hold­
229. 	 U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. 
230. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). It has long 
been recognized that the Fourth Amendment does protect a person's reasonable expec­
tation of privacy. 
231. 	 U.S. CaNST. amend. IV. 
232. David A. Sklansky, Katz v. United States: The Limits ofAphorism, in FaUN. 
DATION PRESS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 223 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). Char­
lie Katz, the defendant in Katz, made his living by wagering on sporting events for him 
and for others, in large part, across state lines by the telephone. Id. at 224. Charlie did 
well for himself; he was living in a hotel room on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. Id. 
On an informant's tip, five FBI agents began an investigation. Id. Everyday the FBI 
watched Charlie leave his hotel and walk to a group of three phone booths down the 
street and make several calls. Id. The FBI placed a recording device on top of one of 
the phone booths, microphones on the back of two of the booths, and an out-of-order 
sign on the third booth. Id. at 224-25. The FBI recorded numerous one-sided conversa­
tions (Charlie's side), which strongly indicated that Charlie was placing bets illegally. 
Id. at 225. The phone company confirmed that the calls were traveling across state lines 
and the FBI arrested and charged Charlie with interstate wagering. Id. 
233. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 
347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Olmstead was a lieutenant with the 
Seattle Police Department who was fired because he was caught smuggling alcohol 
from Canada during Prohibition. Sklansky, supra note 232, at 226. Afterward he be­
came a full-time rum runner, making up to $200,000 per month in sales. Id. Olmstead 
conducted a lot of his business over the telephone. Id. at 227. Despite a general disap­
proval of wiretapping at the time-it was illegal in Washington and against federal pol­
icy-prohibition agents monitored Olmstead's calls. Id. They obtained enough 
information to convict Olmstead and twenty of his associates. Id. 
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ing that the Fourth Amendment protects only material things such a 
person and his house, papers, and effects.234 With the demise of 
Olmstead, the notion that the Fourth Amendment analysis was 
based in property law was extinguished.235 Although the parties in 
Katz put great emphasis on the issue of whether the phone booth 
was a "constitutionally protected area,"236 the Supreme Court re­
jected the notion that the "area" was of constitutional significance, 
because the court has "never suggested that this concept can serve 
as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem."237 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court had the forethought to avoid 
making bright-line rules about what constitutes a constitutionally 
protected area.238 The Constitution expressly guarantees the right 
of the people to be free unreasonable searches of their person.239 
However, it is clear in Brian's hypothetical that the DNA, which 
was searched in the database, was not extracted from Brian's per­
son.240 If the hypothetical was analyzed under a rigid reading of the 
Constitution, Brian would have no protection from the familial 
search because Brian's person was not actually physically searched. 
Such an analysis would deprive Brian of his expectation of privacy 
in the personal and common DNA information that Brian shares 
with his brother. In light of Katz ,241 it should not be dispositive that 
the family member's actual person has not been searched, as long a 
family member such as Brian has a reasonable expectation of pri­
vacy in the common DNA. This is true especially in light of the fact 
that the content of the search reveals extremely private 
information.242 
234. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. 
235. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). 
236. Id. at 351. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Katz's counsel 
framed the issue to eliminate the typical property-based Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Sklansky, supra note 232, at 243. Counsel argued that the Court must not focus on 
whether an area is constitutionally protected, but rather "whether a reasonable person, 
objectively looking at the communications setting, the situation and the location of the 
communicator and communicatee, would ... reasonably believe that the communica­
tion was intended to be confidential." Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, 
Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35)). The point being that the protected interest follows the 
person. Id. 
237. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9. 
238. See id. at 359. 
239. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
240. See supra INTRODUCTION, Part A. 
241. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (rejecting a rigid reading of the Constitution and stat­
ing that the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy interests of people and not places). 
242. See United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 (D. Mass. 2007) (re­
marking that DNA information "is of the most sensitive and personal nature, and it is 
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In Minnesota v. Olson, the Court ruled that a person may have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion 
in a home that is not his own.243 The government argued that Ol­
son, an overnight guest, did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his host's home because he did not have exclusive control 
of the premises and was not free to exclude or admit others as he 
wished,244 The Court rejected this contention and ruled that exclu­
sive control over the place searched is not a necessary factor in or­
der to find that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the place searched.245 The Court reasoned that society recognizes 
the individual's expectation of privacy in the host's home because 
being a host or an overnight guest is a long-standing tradition in our 
country that serves many beneficial functions in our society-most 
people will either be a host or an overnight guest in their life­
. time.246 Overnight guests seek shelter from the elements when at 
the host's home.247 People are most vulnerable when they sleep, so 
they expect privacy and safety when in the host's home.248 
Just as society acknowledges that a person reasonably expects 
privacy from governmental intrusion in his host's home, a family 
member has the same type of reasonable expectation that the DNA 
he shares in common with his family will be kept private from un­
reasonable governmental intrusion. In the hypothetical, Brian took 
great pains to disassociate from his family. Therefore, he has a sub­
jective expectation of privacy that the genetic link will not be traced 
by the government or anyone else. Furthermore, Brian's expecta­
tion of privacy should be recognized by society as reasonable be­
cause family relationships are considered private and sacred.249 
inconceivable that one would expect this information to be readily available to the gov­
ernment or to the public"). 
243. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 99. 
246. Id. at 98-99. 
247. Id. at 99. 
248. Id. 
249. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (calling a family relationship a 
private realm in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment issue); Washington v. Gluck­
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 771 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (acknowledging that there is a 
broad liberty interest to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into the 
privacy of family life); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (re­
counting that the Constitution affords protection to individuals with respect to decisions 
involving their family relationships in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment ques­
tion); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary lnt'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) 
(stating that family relationships, in the context of a First Amendment issue, "presup­
pose 'deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
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It is immaterial that Brian does not have exclusive control over 
his sibling's DNA, and that he does not have an exact match to his 
sibling's DNA under the Olson Court's reasoning. Brian's convict 
brother is, in effect, the "host" and Brian is the "overnight guest." 
Clearly, society must value the privacy interests associated with 
family relationships to a greater extent than the privacy expecta­
tions associated with being an overnight guest.250 Therefore, it is 
logical to conclude that society would recognize Brian's expectation 
of privacy against unreasonable governmental intrusion simply 
based on the fact that Brian is genetically linked to a person with a 
criminal record. 
2. 	 The Lack of a Physical Intrusion in a Familial Search Is 
Immaterial 
The government would likely challenge a family member's ex­
pectation of privacy in common DNA because the DNA is not 
physically extracted from the family member, and yields no highly 
personal or intimate information. Therefore, the government 
would argue that the family member has no standing to assert a 
Fourth Amendment claim because he has not been subject to an 
actual governmental intrusion. However, neither the level of per­
sonal information revealed nor the lack of a physical intrusion de­
termines the validity of a Fourth Amendment claim. In Kyllo v. 
United States, the Supreme Court noted that, in the past, an intru­
sion was easier to discern because it was based on the archaic prop­
erty concept that no search exists unless there was an actual 
physical intrusion into the place searched.251 The law has changed, 
however, and property law concepts have been separated from 
Fourth Amendment analysis.252 After abandoning the property 
concept and in light of ever-advancing technology, Kyllo examined 
what a reasonable expectation of privacy might be.253 Aware of 
technology's potential harm to individuals' right to privacy, the 
Court stated that "[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree 
of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been 
whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but 
also distinctively personal aspects of one's life'" (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984))). 
250. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 99. 
251. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). In Kyllo, the government used 
heat-sensing thermal technology from a parked car across the street from the defen­
dant's home to determine if he was growing marijuana. Id. at 29-30. 
252. Id. at 32. 
253. Id. at 33. 
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entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."254 Therefore, 
the Court did not impose a narrow understanding of the meaning of 
"intrusion." The Court recognized that people's expectation of pri­
vacy in their homes has "roots deep" in our society and "to with­
draw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit 
police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment."255 
Kyllo's dissent argued that the thermal imaging technology did 
not constitute a search because there is no actual intrusion since it 
only gleans images that radiate from outside of the house and by an 
"off-the-wall" observation, as opposed to a "through-the-wall" ob­
servation.256 However, the Court strongly disagreed because it had 
previously rejected such a narrow reading of the Fourth Amend­
ment in Katz.257 Katz held that the use of eavesdropping technol­
ogy that only detected sound waves emanating from a phone booth 
constituted an invasive search even though the sound waves were 
only picked up from the exterior of the phone booth.258 Refusing 
to overturn the holding in Katz, and in order to preserve the pri­
vacy which was envisioned by the Framers of the Fourth Amend­
ment, the Court held that there can be an intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area despite a lack of physical intru­
sion.259 Of great import to the Kyllo Court was the danger that 
more advanced technology was already being used, or being devel­
oped that would render "the homeowner at the mercy of advancing 
technology, including imaging technology that could discern all 
human activity in the home."26o 
In the case of familial searches, the government may make an 
"off-the-walls" type of argument, contending that the search is con­
ducted against DNA already existing in the database and extracted 
from a convict, not the family member, and therefore the informa­
tion gleaned is not a physical intrusion against the family member. 
However, this notion was rejected in Kyllo because a lack of physi­
cal intrusion does not mean that a legitimate interest of privacy has 
not been invaded. The notion should be rejected in the case of fa­
milial searches too. Kyllo was more concerned with the unfair ad­
254. [d. at 33-34. 
255. [d. 
256. [do at 35. 
257. [do at 36. 
25S. [do 
259. [do at 340 
260. [do at 35-36. 
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vantages that the government might gain through the use of new 
technology, which would erode the Fourth Amendment's protec­
tion to the detriment of society. The familial searching technology 
has the same unfair effect, and will unfortunately harm society. 
Members of society will no longer be able to rely on their own good 
and honest behavior to keep them free from the government's 
watchful and intrusive eye. 
There is a limitation set forth by Kyllo.261 When new technol­
ogy is used to conduct a search, a person cannot reasonably expect 
to be free from that particular type of intrusion if the technology is 
readily available for "general public use."262 This is because a per­
son cannot reasonably claim to have an expectation of privacy in 
something that is open for the public to view.263 If the technology is 
available to the public, this would grant it the ability to gain an 
open view, and thus one cannot expect such privacy.264 Today 
CODIS is not available for public use; it is limited to governmental 
use.265 Without the use of the familial search technology, the re­
sulting partial match is not readily discernable by the public. 
Therefore, a family member's expectation of privacy in his common 
DNA can be considered constitutionally reasonable because tech­
nology is not available to the public that can produce accurate 
DNA matches revealing the number of alleles that two relatives 
have in common and the degree of their genetic relationship. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 34. 
263. Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
264. See id. 
265. See Combined DNA Index System, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that CODIS is 
an FBI program that enables national, state, and local crime labs to work together). 
Individuals can have familial DNA testing performed by private companies or self-spec­
imen DNA testing kits. See generally Genetica, DNA Paternity Test, http://www. 
genetica.com/index.php (last visited Dec. 29, 2007). In a private setting, the individual 
must suspect a particular person of having a familial relationship and collect a sample of 
his DNA to conduct the analysis between the two individuals' DNA. See Genetica, 
Accredited DNA Testing Lab, http://www.genetica.com/paternity/self.php (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2007). Clearly, a familial search in CODIS is distinguished from the private 
DNA testing technology that is available to the public. The technology involved in 
CODIS allows one sample of DNA to be compared against millions of random offender 
DNA samples, having no particular suspect, to find a familial match. A member of the 
public would be unable to do a private test to ascertain a familial relationship without 
having the suspect's DNA for comparison and does not have access to the CODIS 
database. Therefore, the CODIS technology is not available to the public in the man­
ner required to invoke Kyllo's physical intrusion exception. 
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3. 	 It Is Immaterial that Junk DNA Is Currently Believed to 
Lack Intimate Information 
The government would likely argue that a familial search is not 
a search protected by the Fourth Amendment because it reveals no 
intimate information and, therefore, a person cannot have a reason­
able expectation of privacy against a familial search. The basis of 
this argument would be that common DNA is not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment because it is not extracted from the family 
member who is a defendant and the type and extent of intimate 
information stored in common DNA has no legal significance. The 
point is that the common DNA that is searched contains informa­
tion that is personal to the composition of the individual family 
member's genetic make-up-his "person."266 In Kyllo, the Su­
preme Court examined whether a person can have a reasonable ex­
pectation of privacy against a search that reveals no specific 
intimate information.267 The Court said that it had never adopted 
the notion that "the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home 
[is] tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information 
obtained."268 
For instance, an officer who simply peaks through an open 
door and observes a rug has seen something intimate because "all 
details are intimate details" in the home, since the home is pro­
tected by the Fourth Amendment.269 Although the Court refused 
to say that the invasion must reveal intimate details to be consid­
ered intrusive and protected by the Fourth Amendment, it stated 
that the heat in the defendant's home was an intimate detail be­
cause it came from within the protected home.27o 
Likewise, family members share common DNA. The portion 
of DNA that is unique to the defendant family member is some­
thing that reveals highly personal genetic information that is found 
within his person, although it is also found in the convict family 
member's person. This is a protected area and, therefore, is an inti­
mate detail that society should readily accept as deserving constitu­
tional protection. It could indicate whether a person has a 
propensity for addiction to drugs or alcohol or other traits, or it 
may reveal information about whether a person has a genetic disor­
266. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
267. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
268. [d. 
269. [d. 
270. [d. at 38. 
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der.271 Applying this to Brian's hypothetical, the familial search re­
vealed information which is stored in Brian's own person, and 
therefore it is highly intimate. Since it is highly intimate, Brian has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common DNA he shares 
with his family. 
Furthermore, the depth of intimate knowledge contained in 
DNA is not yet totally understood. Technology is ever advancing. 
Society should not be surprised if someday technological advances 
bring a new understanding that intimate details are stored in junk 
DNA. Then, family members like Brian who do not have a lowered 
expectation of privacy may have their DNA information analyzed 
and used in ways not even dreamt of in this modern world, simply 
based on a genetic relationship to a convict. 
History has demonstrated how the expanded use of data col­
lected by the government can be detrimental to American citi­
zens.272 It is entirely plausible that, although the government 
initially has a limited use for the stored DNA, the use will be ex­
panded and the data collected will eventually be used in ways that 
will further impede on society's freedom from governmental intru­
sion. The government will have a plethora of information about 
individuals' biological and psychological make-ups273 and a new 
and powerful means of surveillance, which could subject people to 
arbitrary governmental intrusions.274 
Today, the DNA stored in CODIS is considered by the govern­
ment to be junk DNA with no real use other than for identification. 
However, some scientists now question whether the DNA is actu­
ally junk, and believe it may have the potential to reveal "informa­
271. DNA Fingerprinting and Civil Liberties Project, supra note 37. 
272. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 280 (D. Mass. 2007) (predict­
ing that the government will exploit the DNA data it has COllected). For instance, social 
security numbers were initially assigned to citizens for retirement programs, but now 
the numbers are used as a "universal identification number." Id. Furthermore, census 
records initially collected by the government for statistical use were later used to assist 
in the Japanese internment program of World War II. Id. 
273. Meghan Riley, Comment, American Courts Are Drowning in the "Gene 
Pool": Excavating the Slippery Slope Mechanisms Behind Judicial Endorsement of DNA 
Databases, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 115, 145 (2005). 
274. See id. 
579 2008] GUILT BY RELATION 
tion beyond mere identity, relating to health, race, and gender,"275 
and may someday reveal the "very basis of human complexity."276 
As an example of how the stored DNA could be misused, the 
government could conduct genetic profiling based on individuals' 
familial relationships to convicts to try to predict whether crime 
runs in families.277 Once a family member is genetically profiled 
based on "perceived biological truths," a family member may be­
come susceptible to fulfilling the "genetic. prophecy," and become a 
criminal himself.278 Furthermore, the DNA information could be 
distributed to third parties, either unintentionally or without au­
thorization.279 Family members could also potentially be stereo­
typed based on other perceived genetic predispositions, such as to 
disease or sexual orientation.280 Then, as if genetic profiling is not 
intrusive enough, the family member's genetic profile can be 
searched time and again.281 
The intimate information contained in common DNA­
whether now known, or soon to be learned through advances in 
science-is information in which a family member has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against governmental intrusion. Before soci­
ety willingly accepts familial searches, it should understand that the 
practice could open doors that will not easily close. Genetic infor­
mation is the most intimate and private information. Sacrificing 
this privacy will erode the Fourth Amendment's protections into 
meaningless words. 
275. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rein­
hardt, J., dissenting); Gilbert J. Villaflor, Comment, Capping the Government's Needle: 
The Need to Protect Parolees' Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests from Suspicionless 
DNA Searches in United States v. Kincade, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 2347, 2363 (2005). 
276. Riley, supra note 273, at 129 (quoting Clive Cookson, Regulatory Genes 
Found in 'Junk DNA,' FIN. TIMES (London), June 4, 2004, at 11). 
277. See DNA Database Can Flag Suspects, supra note 55. 
278. See generally Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic Ignorance? Protecting Genetic 
Privacy to Ensure Equality, 51 VILL. L. REV. 827, 828-29 (2006). 
279. See generally Yael Bregman-Eschet, Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who 
Controls Our Genetic Privacy?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 14­
15 (2006) (discussing the possibility that third parties might use genetic bio-samples to 
profile people for genetic dispositions; for example, the military could analyze DNA to 
determine sexual orientation). 
280. See Rao, supra note 278, at 828. 
281. See generally Villaflor, supra note 276. 
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B. 	 A Familial Search Is Unreasonable and Violates the Fourth 
Amendment 
The Weikert II court joined the majority of courts that adopt 
the totality of the circumstances test to analyze Fourth Amendment 
challenges to mandatory DNA extractions under the DNA Act.282 
However, Weikert II and other cases that utilize the totality of the 
circumstances test are not on point with a familial search scenario 
because the constitutionality of the DNA Act is not at issue. The 
reasonableness of a search conducted without any individualized 
suspicion, against a free and law-abiding citizen, must therefore be 
analyzed under the special needs test. . Although reversed, Weikert 
I viewed a supervised releasee's expectation of privacy closer to 
that of a law-abiding citizen,283 like a family member. Therefore, 
Weikert I is useful for its discussion about the special needs test and 
the balancing of interests, and will be used for its analysis in this 
Part. 
1. 	 The Primary Purpose of Conducting a Familial Search Is 
to Solve a Crime-Thus No Special Need Exists 
Familial searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amend­
ment because a familial search does not serve any purpose beyond 
assisting the government to solve more crimes. When running a 
familial search, the government has no suspect. The familial search 
is in fact conducted in order to contrive individualized suspicion 
against a convict's family member in order to solve a particular 
crime.284 For example, before the law enforcement authorities ran 
the familial search in Brian's hypothetical, they had ruled out Brian 
as the culprit. They used the search to implicate Brian. 
In the case of familial searches, the government should be re­
quired to assert a compelling and special need in order to justify the 
search when there is no individualized suspicion against the family 
member. The government's primary purpose for running a familial 
search, however, is to solve a particular crime or to "uncover evi­
dence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing."285 It does not serve a 
282. United States v. Weikert (Weikert lJ), 504 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g 
denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
283. United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 267 (D. Mass. 
2006), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 FJd 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
284. 	 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
285. Cf City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (stating that be­
cause the primary purpose of the narcotics checkpoint is to uncover evidence of ordi­
nary criminal wrongdoing, it is not a special need). 
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great societal purpose, such as removing intoxicated drivers from 
the road,286 or protecting people on the railways from the conse­
quences of intoxicated railroad employees287-purposes that were 
considered legitimate special needs according to the Supreme 
Court. 
One of the main reasons for allowing a search based on a spe­
cial need is that it would be impractical to obtain a warrarit. This is 
exemplified in T.L.D.'s school setting where the need to act swiftly 
to protect the children outweighed the minimal intrusion of the 
search and rendered the warrant requirement impractical.288 The 
need to run a familial search is not one that requires an immediate 
response to safeguard members of society. Such a response would 
render the warrant and probable cause requirements so impractical 
as to justify dispensing with them.289 Rather, the familial search is 
more like the unconstitutional roadblock in Edmond290 and the un­
constitutional drug tests in Ferguson,291 which were designed prima­
rily for an ordinary law enforcement purpose: generating evidence 
to solve a crime. 
Courts that have upheld the mandatory extraction of DNA 
have justified the searches by claiming that the government has a 
special need and immediate non-law-enforcement purpose to build 
a DNA-indexing database.292 The district court in Weikert I saw 
through the purported special need to build a DNA-indexing 
database, stating, "The government's purpose ... is not to get 'in­
formation about a crime in all likelihood committed by others' ... 
but instead to determine whether the searched individual has com­
mitted a crime. "293 
286. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,451 (1990); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
287. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989). 
288. New Jersey v. T.L.D., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
289. This result was envisioned by Justice Blackmun at the inception of the spe­
cial needs test. Id. at 353. 
290. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42-43 (holding that a drug interdiction conducted to 
find evidence of a crime violates the Fourth Amendment). 
291. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-84 (2001) (holding that a 
drug testing program designed to find evidence of illegal drug use by pregnant women, 
which would ultimately protect unborn babies, was unconstitutional). 
292. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655, 668 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). 
293. United States v. Weikert (Weikert J), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 
2006) (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-24 (2004», rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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It is absurd to say that the primary purpose of CODIS is to 
build a DNA-indexing database rather than to solve crimes. But it 
is even more absurd to argue that a familial search is anything other 
than an effort to solve a particular crime. Weikert I aptly recog­
nized that the FBI's own website states that the purpose of CODIS 
is to solve crimes.294 Therefore, it is ludicrous to assert that the 
purpose of a smaller search, such as a familial one, could be any­
thing other than to solve crime.295 It is important to distinguish the 
primary purpose from the ultimate, broader social goal, otherwise 
the special needs test will "immunize" all searches conducted ab­
sent individualized suspicion, thereby creating a police state.296 
The government is likely to assert that the special need for fa­
milial DNA tests is something akin to the "information seeking" 
activity held lawful in Lidster.297 It will claim that the familial 
search is merely a tool to gain information about who may have 
been present or may have witnessed a crime, rather than implicate 
that family member as the prime suspect. But the familial search is 
unlike the type of information-seeking search in Lidster because it 
is not designed to gather information from someone who probably 
did not commit the crime. In actuality, the sole and immediate pur­
pose of a familial search is to obtain a lead to solve a crime commit­
ted by a convict's family member. 
2. 	 A Family Member's Privacy Interest Outweighs the 
Interests of the Government 
If the government can surmount the special need hurdle, the 
government must still show that its intrusion is justified because its 
interest in the special need outweighs the privacy interest of the 
affected family member.298 In conducting this balancing test, it is 
important to understand that not every citizen is afforded the same 
level or degree of interest in his privacy. In other words, a person's 
interest in privacy is graded on a scale of reasonableness based on 
that person's status in the legal system. 
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner can­
not reasonably expect privacy in his prison cell, nor can society 
294. Id. 
295. See generally id. 
296. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84. 
297. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423-24 (holding that a search conducted to learn infor­
mation about a crime committed by another person is constitutional). 
298. Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (citing Nicholas v. Goard, 430 F.3d 652, 664 
n.22 (2d Cir. 2005». 
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deem such an expectation of privacy reasonable.299 Prisoners are 
confined involuntarily because they have engaged in behavior that 
society rejects.3OO Such behavior demonstrates that the prisoners 
were unable to conform to society's notions of acceptable conduct 
and unable to exercise self-restraint. Riots, murder of inmates and 
personnel, suicide, rape, assault, and drug trafficking are some of 
the dangers that lurk in prisons.301 Prison authorities have a duty to 
keep the prisoners and third parties safe.302 Thus, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that a prisoner has no Fourth Amendment right 
against governmental searches and seizures within a prison cell be­
cause the prisoner's interest in privacy is diminished by his legal 
status and because the important governmental need outweighs the 
intrusion.303 
Imprisonment in solitary confinement at a maximum security 
prison is at the most extreme end of the punishment continuum and 
a few hours of community service is on the lower end.304 There are 
many points on the continuum that fall between the two ex­
tremes.305 For instance, other points on the continuum are me­
dium- and low-level security imprisonment, parole, probation, and 
halfway houses.306 With each point on the continuum, the scope of 
a convict's privacy interest must be examined. 
With respect to a probationer,307 the Supreme Court held that 
a warrantless search of a probationer's home, authorized by a state 
regulation, is not a Fourth Amendment violation.30B While a proba­
tioner does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home,309 
probation is a criminal sanction for the probationer's antisocial be­
havior that resulted in the probationer's conviction.31o As such, 
probationers do not have the same degree of privacy interest as a 
299. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). 




304. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
305. [d. 
306. [d. 
307. United States v. Stewart, 468 F. Supp. 2d 261, 274 (D. Mass. 2007) (defining 
probation as "'[a] court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to state conditions, re­
leases a convicted person into the community instead of sending the criminal to jail or 
prison.'" (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (7th ed. 1999»). 
308. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872. 
309. [d. at 873. 
310. [d. at 874. 
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law-abiding citizen.311 Rather, the probationer's release into soci­
ety is conditioned upon restrictions.312 Some of the supervisory re­
strictions imposed on probationers are often mandatory 
employment, avoidance of certain places and people, weekends in 
prison, avoidance of alcohol, and allowance of searches by proba­
tion officers.313 These restrictions help to assist in rehabilitation, 
protect citizens, reduce the likelihood of recidivism, and ensure that 
the probationer is safely integrating back into society.314 The intru­
sion of a probationer's privacy interest is justified because the gov­
ernment's special need outweighs the probationer's privacy interest, 
and a warrant requirement would be impractical.315 
Although the court of appeals in Weikert II reversed Weikert I, 
the holding was limited to individuals challenging the DNA Act, 
such as supervised releasees.316 The court of appeals believed that, 
based on Weikert's status as a supervised releasee, he had a re­
duced expectation of privacy that was outweighed by the govern­
ment's interest in identifying, monitoring, and rehabilitating 
criminals, and solving crimes more accurately and efficiently.317 
The holding does not apply to a family member who is a free and 
law-abiding citizen with an undiminished expectation of privacy. 
The district court's decision in Weikert I is valuable for analysis 
regarding the balancing of interests, particularly the intrusiveness of 
storing and analyzing DNA in CODIS. The court believed that an 
analysis of DNA's identifying information constituted a more se­
vere intrusion than the actual extraction of DNA, which requires 
penetration of the skin.318 In fact, the "startling advance of technol­
ogy" will enable DNA samples to be turned into profiles and 
searched time and again throughout a person's lifetime.319 This 




314. Id. at 875. 
315. Id. at 876-80. 
316. United States v. Weikert (Weikert II), 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g 
denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
317. !d. at 11. 
318. United States v. Weikert (Weikert I), 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (D. Mass. 
2006), rev'd, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), reh'g denied en bane, 504 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2007). 
319. See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, J., 
dissenting opinion) (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 867 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting». 
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member's identity given that it is becoming more apparent that vast 
medical information can be revealed from DNA.320 
Sometimes an individual's privacy expectation can be out­
weighed by serious public concerns, as in T.L.O. when the Supreme 
Court found that students' have a legitimate privacy expectation 
that is outweighed by the need to keep students safe.321 A pris­
oner's expectation of privacy against searches in his prison cell is 
obviously lower than a free, law-abiding citizen's right against 
searches because the prisoner is under the control of the state.322 
However, it is unquestionable that an innocent relative of a convict, 
such as Brian, has an undiminished expectation of privacy, which is 
not lowered merely because of his relation to the convict. If the 
family member is a free, law-abiding citizen, then he has a reasona­
ble expectation that identifying DNA information will not be re­
leased without his consent. 
The government's interest in running familial searches is out­
weighed by the family member's significant interest in keeping his 
genetic information free from governmental intrusion. Assuming 
that the government will argue that the familial search is no more 
than a tool to seek information about a given crime and such pur­
pose is a valid special need, the purpose must outweigh the family 
member's liberty interest in order to be considered a reasonable 
and constitutional search. 
Familial searches may help investigators solve more crimes. In 
a case where there is a ten percent chance of solving a crime 
through DNA, the estimated chance of solving it through a familial 
search only increases to fourteen percent.323 However, this alone 
cannot be a justification for violating family members' liberty inter­
ests. The familial search does not provide any additional safety 
measure to the public greater than general law enforcement would 
provide. The government has no special interest that should be af­
forded greater weight than a family member who has an undimin­
ished expectation of privacy and therefore the search must be 
deemed unreasonable. 
320. See Weikert I, 421 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (stating that" 'recent scientific studies 
have begun to question the notion that junk DNA does not contain useful genetic pro­
gramming material'" (quoting Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818 n.6)). 
321. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352-53 (1985) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
322. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,525-26 (1984). 
323. Schmid, supra note 60. 
586 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:543 
CONCLUSION 
The expanded use of CODIS to include familial searches is a 
serious intrusion into family members' expectations of privacy. It is 
an unnecessary intrusion by the government, since it serves no spe­
cial need beyond normal law enforcement activities. Law enforce­
ment authorities are simply making use of the tool as a convenient 
way to sidestep the warrant and probable cause requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. Law enforcement authorities must be re­
quired to obtain a warrant based on probable cause prior to con­
ducting a familial search. Their problem is, of course, that they do 
not have probable cause to suspect any single individual in CODIS, 
and therefore would be unable to obtain the warrant. The unfortu­
nate result of familial searches will be to create suspect pools based 
solely on genetics and not on any individualized suspicion of wrong­
doing. Citizens value their privacy. With the familial search, inno­
cent citizens have lost a measure of privacy that they cannot protect 
against. We can disassociate from our family members, but we will 
always share their DNA. 
Revisiting the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note,324 the 
injustice that may result from this investigatory tool is plain and 
grim. A reputable person such as Brian, someone who has led an 
innocent life even if his family members have not, can find himself a 
criminal suspect because his genetics have characteristics in com­
mon with his convicted family member. It is doubtful that the por­
tion of society related to convicts will be prepared to become 
criminal suspects themselves based on their genetics. Hopefully, 
this expanded use of CODIS will be rejected by society, the courts, 
and Congress. 
Law enforcement has gone too far. As citizens, we must de­
fend our right to be secure from arbitrary intrusions by law enforce­
ment authorities because this right is paramount to our living as a 
free society.325 If allowed, this will put us in a position similar to 
that of the colonist who protested against Writs of Assistance, a 
position that the Framers of the Constitution recognized when they 
adopted the Fourth Amendment.326 As technology advances, so 
324. See supra INTRoDucnoN, Part A. 
325. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949». 
326. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969). 
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should our awareness that such advances could lead to arbitrary 
governmental intrusions, despite the good intentions of law en­
forcement authorities. 
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